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Abstract—Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are becoming more and more important for solving challenging and critical problems
in many fields. CNN inference applications have been deployed in safety-critical systems, which may suffer from soft errors caused by
high-energy particles, high temperature, or abnormal voltage. Of critical importance is ensuring the stability of the CNN inference
process against soft errors. Traditional fault tolerance methods are not suitable for CNN inference because error-correcting code is
unable to protect computational components, instruction duplication techniques incur high overhead, and existing algorithm-based fault
tolerance (ABFT) schemes cannot protect all convolution implementations. In this paper, we focus on how to protect the CNN inference
process against soft errors as efficiently as possible, with the following three contributions. (1) We propose several systematic ABFT
schemes based on checksum techniques and analyze their fault protection ability and runtime thoroughly. Unlike traditional ABFT
based on matrix-matrix multiplication, our schemes support any convolution implementations. (2) We design a novel workflow
integrating all the proposed schemes to obtain a high detection/correction ability with limited total runtime overhead. (3) We perform our
evaluation using ImageNet with well-known CNN models including AlexNet, VGG-19, ResNet-18, and YOLOv2. Experimental results
demonstrate that our implementation can handle soft errors with very limited runtime overhead (4%∼8% in both error-free and
error-injected situations).
Index Terms—Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance, Deep Learning, Silent Data Corruption, Reliability, High-Performance Computing
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning using convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
is becoming the key state-of-the-art technique in science
and technology fields such as image classification [1], [2],
[3], object detection [4], natural language processing [5],
medical image analysis [6], and drug design [7]. More and
more scientific research (such as cosmological simulation
and materials analysis) also is addressing the great potential
of leveraging CNN techniques to analyze extremely large
amounts of data in a supercomputer environment, achieving
unprecedented discoveries in their domains [8].
The reliability of the CNN inference is becoming a
critical concern [9] because CNN inference applications are
being widely utilized in different scenarios, including high-
performance scientific simulations and safety-critical sys-
tems [10], [11] such as aerospace and autonomous vehicles.
A common source of soft errors is the unreliability of
hardware, which may cause serious consequences to CNN
inference systems. Recent literature indicates that soft errors
are inevitable in modern systems, from edge computing
devices to supercomputers [12], [13], because of multiple
factors [14] such as high-energy cosmic radiation [15], aging,
and wear of devices [16]. On the one hand, soft errors on a
supercomputer can corrupt the execution data during deep-
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learning-based scientific simulations or postanalysis based
on scientific datasets, resulting in misleading results. In fact,
recent studies [17], [18], [19], [20] indicate that resilient con-
volutional neural networks are essential for guaranteeing
the correctness of image classification results. On the other
hand, for CNN inference hardware in vehicles, the ISO
26262 standard for functional safety of road vehicles [21]
mandates that the overall failure in time rate be under 10
of the system on a chip. However, Li et al. [20] demonstrate
that a CNN inference accelerator may not achive the ISO
26262 standard because of soft errors while supporting the
continuous running of the object detection application for
autonomous driving.
In addition to the common source, one specific soft
error source should be taken into account, especially for
applications using CNN inference. Power-efficient and cost-
efficient CNN inference accelerators have high demands.
Many [22], [23], [24] of the accelerators adopt overclocking
with voltage underscaling, incurring more soft errors than
common hardware incurs. Consequently, most of related
work [25], [26], [27], [28] has focused on CNN resilient
hardware designs, which are difficult to deploy since they
require hardware changes.
Existing resilient solutions are insufficient for protecting
CNN inference applications against these soft errors. Error-
correcting code (ECC), for example, suffers from memory
area cost and relatively high latency and power consump-
tion. According to [29], ECC with chip-kill applied to all
data, compared with no ECC protection, has an average of
40% overhead in memory energy, 20% overhead in system
energy and 20% overhead in performance for computation-
bounded applications. Moreover, ECC cannot handle mul-
2tiple bit flips or computational errors. Techniques based
on instruction duplication (ID) [30] incur high overhead
and require both application-specific and hardware-specific
optimization; and optimizing and deploying ID techniques
on all CNN accelerators is difficult.
Considering all the drawbacks and limitations of ECC
and ID, algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [31] is an
attractive solution to realize resilient CNN. It has much
lower overhead than other techniques have; and it is archi-
tecture independent, meaning that it supports any hardware
accelerator. The idea of ABFT is to detect and/or correct soft
errors based on the known invariants that the algorithm
has. Over the past thirty years, ABFT schemes have been
successful in detecting errors for matrix operations [32], [33],
[34], [35], iterative methods [36], [37], and data transfor-
mation kernels [38]. However, the existing ABFT schemes
for matrix operations focus mainly on large and square
matrices. Moreover, they incur more than 50% overhead
when applied for CNN soft error protection (shown by our
experiments, reported in Section 6.3 ).
In this paper, we propose a strategy comprising a series
of ABFT schemes for protecting the CNN inference stage
against soft errors. We focus on the convolutional layers
in CNN because they consume the major portion of the
computation time [39], [40].
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• We design several ABFT schemes that can be applied
to any convolution implementation on any hardware.
They can detect and correct errors at runtime. We
provide an in-depth analysis of the ABFT schemes in
terms of fault protection ability and runtime.
• We design a multischeme workflow for soft error pro-
tection with layerwise optimization to obtain a high
detection/correction ability with limited runtime over-
head. Additionally, our solution can protect the bias
operation, grouped convolution, and back propagation.
• We implement an efficient soft error detection library
for CNN, called FT-Caffe, and evaluate FT-Caffe on Im-
ageNet [41] using four popular CNN models: Alexnet
[1], VGG-19 [2], ResNet-18 [3], and YOLOv2 [4]. Exper-
imental results on the Bebop supercomputer [42] using
up to 128 nodes demonstrate that FT-Caffe can keep the
correctness of the inferences with 4%∼8% overhead in
both error-free and erroneous cases.
In the rest of the paper, we first introduce background
about convolutional layers and existing ABFT techniques
applicable to matrix-matrix multiplication (MM)-based con-
volution implementation. In Section 3, we propose four
novel ABFT schemes that can be applied to any convolution
implementations. In Section 4, we analyze the fault protec-
tion ability and runtime of the four schemes and propose
an efficient multischeme workflow integrating all the four
schemes. In Section 5, we discuss how to support bias,
grouped convolution, and back propagation. In Section 6,
we evaluate our solutions for both error-free case and erro-
neous case. In Section 7, we discuss related work on fault
tolerance in convolutional neural networks. We present our
concluding remarks in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
This section introduces some high-level ideas of convolu-
tional layers and the existing ABFT techniques to MM-based
convolution algorithms. The notations and symbols used in
this paper are summarized in Table 1.
2.1 Definition of Convolutional Layer
The convolutional layer can be represented as the following
convolution operation.
O[n][m][x][y] = B[m]+
Ch−1∑
k=0
R−1∑
i=0
R−1∑
j=0
D[n][k][Ux+ i][Uy + j]×W[m][k][i][j]
0 ≤ n < N, 0 ≤ m < M, 0 ≤ x, y < E,E = H−R+U
U
(1)
The convolution operation involves two significant in-
puts: the feature map (fmap) D, D ∈ RN×Ch×H×H , and
the convolutional kernels W, W ∈ RM×Ch×R×R. Note that
all the matrices and vectors in this paper are highlighted
in bold in order to differentiate from the scalar numbers,
according to the naming convention. The bias, denoted as
B, is applied to the output after convolution, and the final
result is denoted as O, O ∈ RN×M×E×E . Since the bias
operation is independent of the convolution computation,
in the rest of this section we describe only the protection for
convolution computation. In Section 5.1, we will discuss the
protection for bias.
TABLE 1
Notations and Symbols Used in This Paper
Notation Description
D Feature map, dimension is 4D
W Kernels, also called filters, dimension is 4D
O Output, dimension is 4D
B Bias, dimension is 1D
C Checksums
S Block summations of O, corresponding to checksums
⊗ Convolution operation
N First dimension of D and O
M First dimension of W and second dimension of O
Ch Second dimension of D and W, also called channels
H Third and fourth dimension of D
R Third and fourth dimension of W
E Third and fourth dimension of O
U Stride size
2.2 Implementation of Convolutional Layer
Convolution can be implemented efficiently in several
ways [43]. The first option is MM-based convolution [44],
which reshapes the kernel and feature map to two tempo-
rary matrices and then applies matrix-matrix multiplication
(MM) on them. Another way to implement convolution
is called direct convolution, which performs the convolu-
tion operation directly. It is widely used in AI accelerators
including Eyeriss [40], DianNao [45] and NVIDIA Deep
Learning Accelerator [46]. Fast Fourier transform–based
convolution [47] leverages FFT to compute the convolution.
It is particularly suitable for the relatively large feature
map and kernel. However, it is inferior to the Winograd
convolution [43] when the sizes of the feature map and
kernel are relatively small.
3Modern CNN frameworks and accelerators generally
automatically choose the best implementations of convo-
lution based on hardware resources and model structure,
because various implementations have different constraints
on memory, architecture, and CNN model.
2.3 ABFT for Matrix-Matrix Multiplication
Traditional ABFT designed for matrix-matrix multiplication
can be applied to the MM calculation of the MM-based
convolution [48], but it has at least three limitations. (1)
It supports only MM-based convolution implementation,
which is not always the best-fit implementation selected
by the CNN framework and accelerator. (2) It incurs high
overhead (more than 50%, as shown in Section 6.3), due to
the small and irregular shape of the matrices used by MM-
based convolution. (3) Moreover, it cannot cover the reor-
ganization operations of feature before the MM calculation.
Therefore, new ABFT schemes are needed in order to protect
the convolutional layer more effectively.
3 NOVEL ABFT SCHEMES FOR CONVOLUTION
In this section, we present four novel ABFT schemes, each
supporting any convolution implementation and being able
to protect the whole convolution process. In Section 4, we
propose a multischeme workflow using all the schemes in
different stages to maximize the soft error protection ability
with minimized performance overhead.
3.1 Preliminary Analysis – Convolution
For clear description, we interpret convolution at the block
level. Specifically, in Equation (1), D, W, and O are all 4D
matrices. They can be represented as being composed of
multiple blocks. For any n andm (0 ≤ n < N, 0 ≤ m < M ),
D[n], W[m], and O[n][m] are blocks. The dimension of D[n],
W[m], and O[n][m] are Ch × H × H , Ch × R × R and
E ×E, respectively. The notation ⊗ is used to represent the
convolution computation between blocks D[n] and W[m].
The convolution operation defined by Equation (1) can be
simplified at the block level as follows.
O[n][m] = D[n]⊗W[m]
0 ≤ n < N, 0 ≤ m < M
(2)
O11
O21
…
On1
O12
O22
…
On2
…
…
…
…
O1m
O2m
…
Onm
CO1
CO3
C
O
2
C
O
4
CO5
CO7
CO6
D1
D2
…
Dn
Cd1
Cd2
W1 W2 … Wm Cw1 Cw2
Input & output Checksum
Data with soft error
(to be used later)
Checksum in use
(to be used later)
Level 1
O1m
Level 2
Fig. 1. Interpretation of Convolution at the Block Level
Equation (2) can be interpreted by using the blue part
in Figure 1. Since each of the 3D substructures of D and W
is treated as a block, D and W can be thought of as two
1D vectors of blocks. At the block level, the convolution
operation is similar to matrix-matrix multiplication. The
element (i, j) of O is calculated by using the ith element
of D and the jth element of W. As illustrated in Figure 1,
the elements involved in the convolutional layers can be
split into two levels, which are covered by our protection
solution, respectively.
We can derive that the convolution operation (denoted
by ⊗) has a distributive property as follows.
D1 ⊗W1 + D2 ⊗W1 =∑Ch−1
k=0
∑R−1
i=0
∑R−1
j=0 D1[k][Ux+ i][Uy + j]×W1[k][i][j]
+
∑Ch−1
k=0
∑R−1
i=0
∑R−1
j=0 D2[k][Ux+ i][Uy + j]×W1[k][i][j]
=
∑Ch−1
k=0
∑R−1
i=0
∑R−1
j=0 (D1+D2)[k][Ux+i][Uy+j]×W1[k][i][j]
= (D1 + D2)⊗W1
Similarly, we can get the following equation.
D1 ⊗W1 + D1 ⊗W2 = D1 ⊗ (W1 + W2) (3)
The distributive property, Formula (3), is the key to proving
the equivalence between the sum of the output and the
output checksum. This property will be used later to prove
the correctness of our design.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis – CNN Checksums
In general, we compute checksums for D and W and then
use them to derive the checksums for O. Soft errors can be
detected and corrected by comparing O with its checksums.
We introduce all the checksums (as shown in Table 2 and
as yellow blocks in Figure 1) that are necessary for our ABFT
schemes.
TABLE 2
Checksums Used by Schemes
Scheme
Checksums Checksums
of D and W of O
Full Checksum (FC) Cd1, Cw1 Co1, Co2
Row Checksum (RC) Cd1, Cd2 Co1, Co3
Column Checksum (ClC) Cw1, Cw2 Co2, Co4
Checksum-of-Checksum (CoC) Cd1, Cw1, Cd2, Cw2 Co5, Co6, Co7
CoC Detection Only (CoC-D) Cd1, Cw1, Cd2, Cw2 Co5
We define the checksums of D and W as follows.
Cd1 =
∑N−1
n=0 D[n]
Cd2 =
∑N−1
n=0 nD[n]
Cw1 =
∑M−1
m=0 W[m]
Cw2 =
∑M−1
m=0 mW[m]
(4)
The four checksums (denoted as input checksums) can
be treated as four blocks of D and W. The checksums
of O (denoted as output checksums) are defined as the
convolution result of input checksums and/or inputs.
Co1 = Cd1 ⊗W
Co2 = D⊗ Cw1
Co3 = Cd2 ⊗W
Co4 = D⊗ Cw2
Co5 = Cd1 ⊗ Cw1
Co6 = Cd1 ⊗ Cw2
Co7 = Cd2 ⊗ Cw1
4The output O is represented in the form of blocks (i.e.,
Level 1 in Figure 1). Elements inside the same block are
independent with respect to checksums ( Level 2 in Figure
1). That is, we perform the checksum comparison indepen-
dently for each element across blocks. Therefore, multiple
soft errors in the same block can be detected and corrected
independently.
In what follows, we describe the four schemes we
proposed, each involving one or more input and output
checksums. The required checksums used by each scheme
are summarized in Table 2.
3.3 Full Checksum Scheme (FC)
The first scheme we designed is called full checksum scheme,
or FC, because it is based on checksums from both D and
W, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 2.
Cd1 and Cw1 are calculated before the convolution op-
eration, so any memory error striking D or W during the
convolution would not affect Cd1 or Cw1. As for the output
checksums, we can get the following equations by applying
the distributive property of ⊗.
Co1[m] =(
N−1∑
0
Dn)⊗Wm =
N−1∑
0
(Dn ⊗Wm) =
N−1∑
0
O[n][m]
Co2[n]=Dn ⊗ (
M−1∑
0
Wm) =
M−1∑
0
(Dn ⊗Wm) =
M−1∑
0
O[n][m]
These equations show the equality between the sum of
output and the output checksums. Let So1 and So2 be the
summation of the output, where So1[m] =
∑N−1
0 O[n][m]
, So2[n] =
∑M−1
0 O[n][m]. We can compare Co1, Co2 with
So1, So2 to detect, locate, and correct soft errors if they exist.
3.4 Row Checksum Scheme (RC)
Compared with the full checksum scheme, the second ABFT
scheme we designed involves only the row checksums of
output O, so we call it row checksum scheme.
The row checksums used in this scheme are Co1 and
Co3. Co3 is computed from convolution operation between
Cd2 and W, and the related output summation is defined by
So3[m] =
∑N−1
0 n×O[n][m].
For the detection of soft errors, we need to compare Co1
with So1. If they are not equal to each other at location j, the
error can be located by i = Co3[j]−So3[j]
Co1[j]−So1[j]
and j, and it can be
corrected by adding Co1[j]− So1[j] to the block (i, j).
3.5 Column Checksum Scheme (ClC)
The third scheme we proposed is called column checksum
scheme because it involves only the column checksums of
output O. The column checksums used in this scheme are
Co2 and Co4. Co4 is defined by performing convolution
operation between Cw2 and D, and the related output
summation is defined as So4[n] =
∑M−1
0 m × O[n][m]. To
detect soft errors, we compare Co2 with So2 first. If they are
not equal to each other at location i, the error can be located
by i and j (=Co4[i]−So4[i]
Co2[i]−So2[i]
), and it can be recovered by adding
Co2[i]− So2[i] to the block (i, j).
3.6 Checksum-of-Checksum Scheme (CoC/CoC-D)
Unlike the three schemes that all need D and/or W to
calculate output checksums, the last scheme we proposed
involves neither D nor W but only their checksums, so
it is named checksum-of-checksum scheme (or CoC scheme
for short). Specifically, Co5, Co6, and Co7 are the output
checksums we will use in this scheme. Similar to Co1, using
the distributive property can get three equations between
the output checksums and output as follows.
Co5 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
O[n][m] = So5
Co6 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
m×O[n][m] = So6
Co7 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
n×O[n][m] = So7
So5, So6, and So7 are defined as output summations
corresponding to Co5, Co6, and Co7. Let O(i, j) be the
corrupted output block, O′ be the correct output, and let
δ = O′[i][j] − O[i][j] be the difference. Using the output
checksums, we can get the following.
Co5 − So5 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
O′[n][m]−O[n][m] = δ
Co6−So6 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
n×(O′[n][m]−O[n][m]) = i×δ
Co7−So7 =
∑N−1
n=0
∑M−1
m=0
m×(O′[n][m]−O[n][m]) = j×δ
The location i, j can be obtained by i = (Co6 − So6)/δ
and j = (Co7 − So7)/δ. Then the soft error can be fixed by
adding δ to O[i][j].
If only soft error detection is required, we do not need
to compute Co6 and Co7, thus reducing the number of
computations. Input checksums regarding Cd1, Cd2 and
Cw1, Cw2, however, are still required for soft error detection.
We denote such a detection scheme by CoC-D.
4 MULTISCHEME WORKFLOW
In this section, we first discuss the fault protection abilities
and runtime of the four schemes we proposed in Section
3. Then, we propose a multischeme workflow, powered by
calibrated arrangement of the four schemes and layerwise
optimization.
4.1 Analysis of Protection Ability for Convolution
Checksum Schemes
In this section, we analyze the fault protection ability of all
the schemes.
4.1.1 Fault Model
The fault model for soft errors that we discuss in this paper
includes transient faults in computational units and data
corruption faults (both transient and persistent) in memory
(including cache). In the following text, we use fault to rep-
resent a malfunction event, and we denote its corresponding
symptom as soft error.
Soft error protection includes error detection and error
correction. Error detection means that the scheme can detect
5soft errors without knowing the exact location. Error correc-
tion means that the scheme can locate the soft error locations
and recover the incorrect result.
Without loss of generality, in the following analysis we
consider at most one fault per convolution. One convo-
lutional neural network contains several or even tens of
convolutional layers, and the total forward execution time
of a CNN model is usually within seconds. Thus, we can
reasonably assume that at most one fault may strike to one
convolutional layer, considering the short executing time of
a single layer. Multiple faults per convolution can also be
detected by our schemes and recovered by recomputing the
corrupted convolutional layer.
4.1.2 Analysis of Soft Error in D and W
One fault occurring during the convolution execution can
result in multiple soft errors in W and D. The soft errors
in W can be detected by comparing the checksum of W
with Cw1 and corrected by reloading weights from the CNN
model. The soft errors in D do not need correction because
D will be discarded after convolution computation; the
resulting errors in the output can be detected and corrected
by the checksums of the output, as demonstrated below.
4.1.3 Analysis of Soft Error in O
One fault during the convolution execution can result in
corruption of one block row or column of O. By definition,
the row i of O is computed by the ith block of D with W .
Thus, one fault in D would result in at most one corrupted
row. The column j of O is computed by D with the jth
block of W. Thus, one fault in W would result in at most one
corrupted column. Moreover, the intermediate result will be
reused only by the same row or column, such that one fault
in the computational units would corrupt only values in the
same row or column. Accordingly, in the following sections
we discuss the soft error protection ability in the context of
at most one corrupted row or column of O.
4.1.4 Soft Error Protection Ability of CoC Scheme
Figure 2 demonstrates the protection ability of the CoC
scheme when soft errors strike the input or output data. As
shown in Figure 2(a), multiple soft errors can be detected
by using only Co5. A single soft error in O can be corrected
by CoC using all checksums including Co5, Co6, and Co7,
as shown in Figure 2 (b). However, CoC cannot correct soft
errors across multiple blocks in O.
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Fig. 2. Soft Error Protection Ability of CoC Scheme (Soft error happens
in inputs and outputs)
Figure 3 illustrates the protection ability of the CoC
scheme when soft errors happen inside the checksums.
Such soft errors can cause inconsistency among the output
checksums of CoC, which can be used for error detection.
For example, in Figure 3(a), Cd1 is corrupted, leading to
corrupted Co5 and Co6 with correct Co7. We can detect
this abnormal pattern when comparing checksums with the
summation of O to detect the input checksum corruption.
The input D, W, and output O are clean and without soft
errors since fault frequency is at most once per convolution.
Thus, we can safely discard all the checksums and finish this
convolution computation.
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Fig. 3. Soft Error Protection Ability of CoC Scheme (Soft error happens
in checksums)
4.1.5 Soft Error Protection Ability of Row Checksum
Scheme and Column Checksum Scheme
Since the row checksum scheme and column checksum
scheme are symmetric with each other, we discuss them
together in this section. As shown in Figure 4(a), the row
checksum scheme can detect and correct soft errors if they
are in the same row. If the soft errors are in the same column,
as shown in Figure 4(b), the row checksum scheme can only
detect soft errors; it has no correction ability. The column
checksum scheme, on the contrary, can detect and correct
errors located in the same column but fail to correct those
appearing in the same row.
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Fig. 4. Soft Error Protection Ability of Row/Column Checksum Schemes
4.1.6 Soft Error Protection Ability of Full Checksum
Scheme
The full checksum scheme has the highest ability to correct
soft errors. The scheme uses both the row checksum Co1
and column checksum Co2 so that it can correct soft errors in
both directions, as shown in Figure 5(a)(b). If soft errors exist
in Co1 (Figure 5(d)), however, Co1 can no longer be used to
locate or correct soft errors. To support error correction in
this situation, we use checksum Co5 and Co6 from the CoC
scheme to locate the corrupted column, and we then use Co2
to correct the soft errors. If soft errors exist in Co2 (Figure
65(c)), Co5 and Co7 are used to locate the corrupted row, and
Co1 is used to correct the soft errors.
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Fig. 5. Soft Error Protection Ability of Full Checksum Scheme
4.1.7 Conclusion
In this section, we define our fault model and analyze the
soft error protection ability of four schemes. We conclude
that the CoC scheme has the lowest error correction ability
and that the full checksum scheme has the best error correc-
tion ability. The abilities of the row checksum scheme and
column checksum scheme are higher than that of the CoC
scheme but lower than that of the full checksum scheme.
CoC-D (discussed in Section 3.6) can detect multiple soft
errors but without correction ability. The analysis here
serves as the fundamental basis of our low-overhead high-
protection design, which will be presented in Section 4.3.
4.2 Runtime Analysis
In this section, we analyze the time complexity theoretically
and present runtimes of all schemes based on experiments.
Table 3 shows the time complexity of some basic check-
sum operations, where α is the coefficient of CPU-intensive
operations and β represents the coefficient for memory-
intensive operations.
TABLE 3
Runtimes of Basic Operations
Operation Derived Runtime
Single block level convolution D[n]⊗ W[m] αChR2E2
Total convolution operations αNMChR2E2
Compute the checksum of D βNChH2
Compute the checksum of O βNME2
Table 4 shows the theoretical time complexity of all the
schemes. The full checksum scheme has the best soft error
correction ability; however, its runtime is relatively long.
Although the CoC scheme has lower ability than the other
three schemes in correcting soft errors, it has the shortest
runtime. Note that the kernel checksum Cw1 and Cw2 can
be precalculated before the application; there is no cost in
generating kernel checksum in the row, column, and CoC
schemes.
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Fig. 6. Worst-Case Normalized Runtime, Baseline is CoC-D
To verify the correctness of the derived time complexity
of the four schemes, we execute them on a supercomputer
using four CNN models. We show the normalized worst-
case runtime of the four schemes in the separate column
of Figure 6. Other columns of this Figure represent the
worst-case runtime of multischeme workflows and will be
discussed in the next section. Experiments confirm our con-
clusion that CoC and CoC-D have the shortest runtime and
that the runtime of the full checksum scheme is relatively
long. We also see that the column checksum scheme has a
much longer runtime than the row checksum scheme does.
The reason is twofold. On the one hand, W blocks have
smaller sizes than D blocks have, leading to longer time to
compute D⊗ Cw2 by the column checksum scheme than to
compute Cd2 ⊗ W by the row checksum scheme. On the
other hand, computing row checksums (Co1 and Co3) is
more efficient than computing column checksums (Co2 and
Co4), because the row checksum calculation can be reduced
to efficient column-summation operations.
TABLE 4
ABFT Schemes Runtime
Scheme Derived Runtime
Soft Error
Correction Ability
FC α(N +M)ChR2E2 + β(NChH2 + 2NME2) High
RC 2αMChR2E2 + 2β(NChH2 +NME2) Middle
ClC 2αNChR2E2 + 2β(NME2) Middle
CoC 3αChR2E2 + β(2NChH2 + 3NME2) Low
4.3 Multischeme Workflow for Soft Error Protection
The four schemes we proposed have pros and cons in terms
of their soft error correction ability and runtime overhead.
To achieve the highest protection ability and lowest over-
head, we propose a multischeme workflow by integrating
the four schemes, as shown in Figure 7. The workflow is
made up of two modules: error detection and error correc-
tion. In our designed workflow, we use CoC-D to detect
errors because it has the lowest overhead. For the error
correction, we put CoC in the beginning because it is the
most lightweight method. By comparison, FC has highest
correction ability but also highest time overhead, so we put
it at the end of the workflow.
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Fig. 7. Multischeme Workflow Designed to Detect/Correct Soft Errors
The error detection modules will be executed for every
execution whether there is a soft error or not. Thus, any
unnecessary computations should be avoided in order to
reduce the overall overhead. For instance, both CoC-D and
FC are able to detect all the soft errors, but we adopt only
CoC-D in the workflow for error detection because FC has a
much higher overhead. RC and ClC cannot detect soft errors
correctly if the checksum is corrupted.
The error correction module will not be executed until
some soft errors are detected. The schemes in this module
will be invoked to fix soft errors according to the workflow.
If it fails to correct the errors due to inconsistency of check-
sum blocks or illegal error locations, the next-level scheme
will be invoked.
Since the checksums can be reused among different CNN
schemes in the workflow, the runtime of the workflow is
actually lower than the sum of all schemes’ runtimes. For
example, both CoC-D and CoC use Co5; if CoC-D detects
soft errors and CoC is invoked to correct soft errors, CoC
can save the time of computing Co5 and its corresponding
summation So5, since they have been computed by CoC-
D. This analysis can also be confirmed by our experiments.
As shown in Figure 6, the relative runtime of CoC in the
second column is reduced compared with that of CoC in the
first column. The relative runtime of RC in the third column
is reduced compared with that of RC in the first column.
The decision to put RC and ClC in the workflow between
CoC and FC is controlled by each layer. The reason to control
RC/ClC in each layer is that their relative runtimes differ
across layers. Since RC and ClC are symmetric based, in
the following we present our analysis based mainly on RC,
without loss of generality.
We denote the runtime of the workflow CoC+FC as t0,
the runtime of workflow CoC+RC as t1, and the runtime
of workflow CoC+RC+FC as t2. Enabling RC can fix some
soft errors before FC, thus changing the runtime from t0 to
t1. When RC fails to correct soft errors, however, FC still
needs to be invoked; and the runtime will increase from t0
to t2. Denoting the probability of row soft errors by pr and
the probability of column soft errors by pc, we can derive
the average time saved by RC as ty = pr(t0 − t1) and the
average time increase by RC as tn = pc(t2 − t0). In order
to minimize the total runtime, RC should be enabled when
ty > tn.
We give an example to further illustrate when RC should
be enabled. Figure 6(b) shows the average runtime among
all the convolutional layers in YOLOv2. In this figure, the
runtime of CoC+RC is much lower than that of CoC+FC,
and the runtime of CoC+RC+FC is slightly higher than that
of CoC+FC. Therefore, enabling RC can save significant
runtime when the soft errors are able to be corrected by
RC. On the other hand, a bit runtime penalty is incurred if
RC fails to correct the soft errors. However, for the conv8
layer in YOLOv2 (shown in Figure 6(c)), CoC+RC’s runtime
is close to that of CoC+FC. Thus, enabling RC in this layer
would barely reduce the overall runtime even though the
soft errors can be corrected by RC. Moreover, CoC+RC+FC’s
runtime is much higher than CoC+RC’s. As a result, the total
runtime will increase significantly if the soft errors cannot
be corrected by RC. Hence, for this layer, it is better to use
CoC+FC for error correction with RC disabled.
In practice, the runtime t0, t1 and t2 can be computed
by offline profiling. The probability values pc and pr can
be estimated based on the size of D and size of W. For
instance, the soft error often strikes each element in the
input under the independent and identical distribution. In
this situation, it is easy to drive that the probability of soft
errors occurring in D is proportional to that of W (i.e., pr
pc
=
number of elements in D
number of elements in W
.
5 RESOLVING BIAS, GROUPED CONVOLUTION, AND
BACK PROPAGATION
In this section, we extend our solution to support bias,
grouped convolution, and the back propagation of convo-
lutional layers.
5.1 Bias
Bias is a 1D vector that needs be added to the output of the
convolutional layers. FT-Caffe provides protection for the
bias operation.
Many CNN frameworks add bias on the fly with the
convolution calculation. As a result, the output O already
contains bias, whereas the output checksums do not con-
tain bias since they are calculated by inputs and input
checksums without bias. In order to compare the output
checksums and the output O, bias has to be subtracted
from output summation before comparison. Subtracting
bias from output O directly before verification and then
adding bias to O after verification is not feasible, however,
because of the overhead of modifying every element in O.
Table 5 shows the output checksums and adjusted output
summation for comparison in order to detect errors. The
bias part of the formulations can be precomputed.
TABLE 5
Bias Adjustments for Output Checksums Comparison
Checksum Adjust Summation
Co1 So1[m][i][j]−N × Bias[m]
Co3 So3[m][i][j]− (
∑
N
i=1
i)× Bias[m]
Co2 So2[n][i][j]−
∑
mBias[m]
Co4 So4[n][i][j]−
∑
mm×Bias[m]
Co5 So5[i][j]−N ×
∑
m Bias[m]
Co6 So6[i][j]−N ×
∑
mm× Bias[m]
Co7 So7[i][j]− (
∑
N
i=1
i)×
∑
mBias[m]
85.2 ABFT for Grouped Convolution
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Fig. 8. Demonstration of Grouped Convolution, Groups = 2
Grouped convolution is a special kind of convolution.
Our schemes need to be modified to support this convolu-
tion.
Define the number of groups as G. Each fmap basic
block has Ch
G
instead of Ch channels. All theM kernel basic
blocks are divided into G groups, each having M
G
3D basic
blocks. The kernel block in the gth group does convolution
only with the gth channel group of every fmap block. Figure
8 shows this process for N=2, M=4, and G=2.
The checksums for fmap Cd1 and Cd2 stay the same. The
checksum for kernel are redefined as
Cw1 = [
M
G
−1∑
m=0
W[m],
2M
G
−1∑
m=M
G
W[m], ...,
M−1∑
m=(G−1)M
G
W[m]]
Cw2 = [
M
G
−1∑
m=0
m×W[m],
2M
G
−1∑
m=M
G
m×W[m], ...,
M−1∑
m=(G−1)M
G
m×W[m]]
where Cw1 and Cw2 are the combination of G checksums
from each kernel group. Each checksum has Ch
G
channels,
so Chw1 and Chw1 each have G
Ch
G
= Ch channels, which
are the same with every fmap block.
The definition of output checksums Co1, Co2, ..., Co7
stays the same. Let X [l..r] represent the channels from l
to r in matrix X . We can prove the following property for
any D[n] and W[m] according to Equation (1).
D[n]⊗W[m] = D[n][1..k − 1]⊗W[m][1..k − 1]
+D[n][k..Ch]⊗W[m][k..Ch], 0 ≤ k < Ch
Using this equation, we can prove the relation between Co2
and O as follows.
Co2[n] = D[n]⊗ [
M
G
−1∑
m=0
W[m],
2M
G
−1∑
m=M
G
W[m], · · · ,
M−1∑
m=(G−1)M
G
W[m]]
= D[n][0..C
G
−1]⊗
M
G
−1∑
m=0
W[m]+D[n][C
G
.. 2C
G
−1]⊗
2M
G
−1∑
m=M
G
W[m]
+ · · ·+ D[n][ (G−1)C
G
..C − 1]⊗
M−1∑
m= (G−1)M
G
W[m]
=
M−1∑
0
D[n]⊗W[m] =
M−1∑
0
O[n][m]
Similar equations can be proved for Co1,Co3,Co4, Co5,
Co6, and Co7. Therefore, all the ABFT schemes we proposed
can be applied to grouped convolution.
5.3 ABFT for Convolution Back Propagation
Our schemes can also be applied to back propagation to-
gether with forward pass so that the convolutional layers
can be fully protected in the training phase.
During back propagation, the gradient of kernel ∇W
is used by methods such as gradient descent in order to
update W. The gradient of fmap ∇D is used to get ∇O
of the previous layer. As shown in Figure 9, the gradients
are calculated as D ⊗ ∇O = ∇W and WT ⊗ ∇O = ∇D.
Checksums for ∇O are used in this situation to protect the
two convolution operations.
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Fig. 9. Demonstration of Checksum Design for Back Propagation
Since CNN models are usually trained in a more stable
environment than the inference stage and since the training
stage can tolerate some soft errors because of their iterative-
convergent nature, we focus our experiments on the infer-
ence stage.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our multischeme workflow
using our FT-Caffe fault tolerance CNN framework.
6.1 Experimental Setup
FT-Caffe. Our FT-Caffe framework is based on Intel-Caffe.
MKL-DNN is enabled to support dynamic selection of con-
volution execution. MKL-DNN contains all the convolution
implementations we discussed in Section 2.2. It automati-
cally chooses the most suitable implementation to use for
each convolutional layer. To compare the runtime overhead
of our solution with that of the ABFT designed for matrix-
matrix multiplication, we also perform the experiments
based on the MM-based convolution implementation.
CNN models and dataset. We tested our FT-Caffe with four
widely used networks: AlexNet, VGG-19, ResNet-18, and
YOLOv2. Pretrained Caffe models are used together with
model prototypes for deployment. We adopt the ImageNet
validation set, which contains 50k images. The images are
preprocessed to smaller size in order to save picture pro-
cessing time when the program starts. The batch size is set
to 64.
Experimental platforms. We conducted our experiments on
the Bebop supercomputer [42] at Argonne National Labora-
tory using up to 128 nodes. Each node is equipped with 128
GB memory and two Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 processors (each
with 16 cores)
Error injection. To demonstrate the overhead of our fault
tolerant solutions, we inject soft errors at the source code
level as most ABFT works did [34], [38]. The consequences
of one computational fault or memory fault are simulated by
9randomly corrupting selected row or column of inputs and
output. We denote the total number of convolutional layers
of a CNN model as L. To assess the overhead accurately,
we run the experiments for L epochs corresponding to the
numbers of convolutional layers of each network (L= 5,
9, 16, 21 for AlexNet, YOLOv2, VGG-19, and ResNet-18,
respectively). For the ith epoch, we inject errors to ith con-
volutional layer. The final overhead is the arithmetic mean
of all the inference executions and the standard deviation in
our experiments is within 5%.
6.2 Experimental Results with MKL-DNN
In this section, we present our evaluation results with MKL-
DNN . We analyze the results from the perspective of execu-
tion time overhead for both error-free cases and erroneous
cases.
Error-free cases. The experimental results in the error-
free cases are presented in Figure 10(a). We can see from
the figure that our FT-caffe can protect the inference stage
with less than 4%, 4.5%, 8%, and 5% overhead for AlexNet,
VGG-19, YOLOv2, and ResNet-18, respectively, regardless
of the convolution implementation. These results show that
our CoC-D error detection scheme has relatively short run-
time compared with the convolution execution, which is
attributed to the design of avoiding unnecessary compu-
tations in our solution (see Section 4.3). The reason ResNet-
18 has higher overhead than the other models have is that
the ResNet-18 has small convolution kernels (W size is
M×C×3×3) in all the convolutional layers, which have
relatively short computing time; thus, the checksum compu-
tation and verification time percentage would be relatively
large.
Erroneous cases – RC/ClC disabled. To show the effective-
ness of our layerwise optimization for RC/ClC, we first
test our multischeme workflow with RC/ClC disabled in
erroneous cases. Figure 10(b) demonstrates that the run-
time overheads (including both error detection and error
correction) of the four CNN models are all below 9%. The
error detection overhead is higher than the error correction
overhead because the error detection scheme is executed for
every convolution operation whereas the error correction
schemes are invoked only when errors are detected. The full
checksum scheme dominates the error correction overhead,
thus confirming our analysis in Section 4 that FC has high
protection ability and relatively longer runtime.
Erroneous cases – layerwise RC/ClC optimization. Figure
10(c) demonstrates the runtime overhead with layerwise
optimization enabled. Every layer decides whether to use
RC/ClC independently, as described in Section 4.3. Com-
pared with Figure 10(b), the error correction overhead de-
creases by 40%∼60% (e.g., 1.55% → 0.72% for YOLOv2 as
shown in Figure 10(b) vs. (c)) in all CNN models because of
the effectiveness of RC. Figure 11(a) shows the distribution
of varies workflows that is the result of layerwise RC/ClC
optimization. We can see that RC is enabled in all layers of
AlexNet and VGG-19, while it is disabled in 30% to 40% of
layers in ResNet-18 and YOLOv2. The results demonstrate
the need for layerwise RC optimization since RC is not
suitable for all layers in the same CNN model. Figure 11(b)
shows the distribution of soft errors by the schemes that
correct them. Less than 5% of soft errors are corrected
by CoC because of the low correction ability of CoC. RC
corrects nearly 90% of the soft errors in AlexNet and VGG-
19 because RC is enabled in all layers of the two CNN
models and the probability of soft errors striking a row
in O is higher than the probability of soft errors striking
a column.
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Fig. 10. Runtime Overhead with MKL-DNN
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Fig. 11. Breakdown Analysis of Multischeme Workflow with MKL-DNN
Erroneous cases – breakdown of error correction overhead by
layer. To better illustrate the overhead of our solution for
each model, we present in Figure 12 the breakdown of the
overhead by layer. The figure demonstrates that layers have
diverse overheads of error protection due to the different
shapes of D and W. We also notice that the overhead of RC
differs among layers in the same model, thus confirming the
functionality of our layerwise RC/ClC optimization.
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Fig. 12. Breakdown of Runtime Overhead by Layer with MKL-DNN
6.3 Experimental Results with MM-Based Convolution
In this section, we evaluate the runtime overhead of
our multischeme workflow and the traditional MM-based
10
ABFT. Since the MM-based ABFT supports only the MM-
based convolution implementation, we set the convolution
implementation to the MM-based mode in MKL-DNN. We
implemented MM-based ABFT rigorously based on [33],
which has ≤1% overhead for large and square matrices
as claimed by the authors of that work. The overhead of
the MM-based ABFT in convolution execution is shown in
Table 6. The MM-based ABFT incurs up to 60% overhead
even without error injection for the four CNN models.
This result is consistent with our analysis in Section 2.3.
Considering that the MM-based ABFT cannot protect the
whole process of MM-based convolution and cannot protect
other convolution implementations, we conclude that the
MM-based ABFT is unsuitable for soft error protection of
CNN applications.
Figure 13 shows the overhead of our multischeme work-
flow for MM-based convolution. The overhead of our so-
lution is below 6% in the error-free cases and below 6.5%
in the cases with injected errors for all CNN models. The
layerwise RC/ClC optimization reduces the overhead for
error correction by as much as 77%. Figure 14(a) shows the
fractions of different workflows chosen by convolutional
layers. Figure 14(b) shows the distribution of soft errors
that are corrected by different schemes. Compared with the
MKL-DNN implementation, more layers adopt RC for error
correction in the MM-based convolution (see Figure 11 ver-
sus Figure 14). The reason is that the relative runtime of RC
compared with FC is lower in the MM-based convolution
implementation than other implementations.
TABLE 6
Overhead of MM-Based ABFT for MM-Based Convolution, No Error
Injection
Model AlexNet YOLOv2 VGG-19 ResNet-18
Overhead 27.9% 57.5% 45.8% 61.2%
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Fig. 13. Runtime Overhead with MM-based Convolution
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Fig. 14. Breakdown Analysis of Multischeme Workflow with MM-Based
Convolution
6.4 Parallel Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the parallel performance evalu-
ation results for AlexNet, YOLOv2, VGG-19, and ResNet-
18. Original images of the ImageNet validation dataset are
used without preprocessing in order to better demonstrate
the process of parallel CNN inference application. In the
beginning of the parallel process, images are distributed
to the local disk of each node; then each node starts to
do the data processing step first to convert the images to
suitable size required by CNN models, and then execute
the inference step under the protection of our multischeme
workflow.
We conducted the parallel evaluation in both error-free
and erroneous cases. However, because of space limits, we
present only the parallel performance evaluation results in
the situation with injected errors (as shown in Figure 15).
In fact, the evaluation results in the error-free situation are
similar. Specifically, experiments show that our multischeme
workflow has a very good scalability: that is, the soft error
protection overhead does not increase with the number of
nodes at all. In absolute terms, the overhead stays around
2%∼6% in the erroneous cases and is only 1%∼4% in the
error-free cases.
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Fig. 15. Parallel Performance Evaluation of Our Solution with Injected
Errors on Bebop Supercomputer
7 RELATED WORK
The importance of fault tolerance for convolution has been
emerging in recent years. Guaranteeing the correctness of
inference is vital in a safety-critical use case [20]. To achieve
better resiliency for CNN networks, researchers have been
exploring solutions from different perspectives including
hardware, system, and software. For hardware, Kim et al.
[49] proposed a hardened 3D die-stacked memory based
on the fault characteristics in convolutional DNNs. Li et
al. [20] proposed to add redundant circuits selectively to
harden the latches based on analysis of data resiliency.
Compared with traditional full-hardware redundancy tech-
niques, those partial-hardware redundancy techniques may
not double the power usage. However, hardware modifica-
tion incurs significant effort considering the varied CNN
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models and their accelerators. At the system level, other
than the DMR/TMR protection, checkpoint/restart (C/R)
is also applied to large-scale machine learning systems,
such as TensorFlow [50]. Subsequently, Qiao et al. pro-
posed a more efficient C/R scheme based on their derived
upper bound on extra iteration cost with perturbations
[51]. While those C/R techniques are promising to protect
model training from soft errors, they are not good fits for
inference since one inference execution could be very fast
and applying C/R incurs significant overhead. Researchers
have therefore pursued lightweight software-level solutions.
By applying ABFT techniques for MM-based convolution,
Santos et al. [48] reported that 50%∼60% of radiation-
induced corruptions could be corrected. Unfortunately, the
traditional ABFT works only for MM-based convolution,
which is inefficient in most cases. In contrast, our solutions
can work for any convolution implementations.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work focus on extending ABFT to convolution oper-
ations in convolutional neural networks. We propose four
ABFT schemes and a multischeme workflow to protect
the convolutional layer. We further extend our schemes to
support bias, grouped convolution, and convolution back
propagation. We implement an efficient CNN framework,
FT-Caffe, that is resilient to silent data corruption.
Experiments demonstrate that our proposed fault-
tolerant solutions incur negligible overhead. In absolute
terms, FT-Caffe can acheive less than 8% overhead for the
most widely used CNN models, including AlexNet, YOLO,
VGG-19, and ResNet-18, in both error-free and erroneous
cases.
We plan to extend the implementation to more CNN
frameworks and to design architecture-specific optimiza-
tions for different hardware including GPU, FPGA, and AI
accelerators.
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